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The Cost of Dishonesty on Optimal Distributed Frequency
Control of Power Networks
Nima Monshizadeh Claudio De Persis John W. Simpson-Porco
Abstract—Optimal frequency controllers for power networks
based on distributed averaging have previously been shown to
be an effective means of distributing control authority among
agents while maintaining a globally optimal operating point.
Distributed control architectures however require an implicit
trust between participating agents, in that each must faithfully
communicate the appropriate control variables to neighboring
agents. Here we study the case where some agents attempt to
“cheat the system” by adding a bias to the averaging controller
in order to lower their generation cost. We quantify the effect
of this dishonesty on the resource allocation problem and
introduce a “cost graph” whose weights measure the effect of
the bias on the optimal equilibrium. Moreover, we propose an
“honesty-enforcing” controller which counteracts the dishonest
agents, and restores the optimal setpoint of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern power system is currently evolving at a rapid
pace, from a centrally-managed hierarchical system based
on bulk generation, to a more decentralized system based
on distributed energy resources. The most basic challenge
in operating the grid is to continuously balance electrical
generation and load, and the AC frequency of the grid
provides a globally-available measurement signal indicating
the supply-demand balance. Balancing is typically accom-
plished through a combination of decentralized frequency
feedback control at bulk generators, along with centralized
optimization by system operators using forecasts. However,
as bulk generation is slowly replaced by distributed gener-
ation, control authority is more dispersed, and small-scale
power electronic devices will shoulder an increasing amount
of the responsibility for grid-wide frequency control and
online optimization.
As a method for achieving the performance of centralized
optimization while distributing frequency control responsi-
bility among many small-scale devices, distributed frequency
controllers based on distributed averaging (consensus) have
been proposed by several authors [1]–[4]. These controllers
fuse decentralized integral control with inter-unit coopera-
tion: the integral action ensures that the grid frequency is
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regulated, while cooperation ensures that the units converge
to a common marginal economic cost, thereby minimizing
the total cost of generation.
For global optimality to be achieved, each participating
unit must cooperate with the other participants in good faith.
It may however be beneficial for any particular unit to break
this pact, and potentially gain an economic advantage over
the other, more honest units. Global optimality — and even
convergence — would no longer be guaranteed. Among the
many possible scenarios, we consider in this paper the case
in which the controllers broadcast biased marginal costs, and
study the effect of this corrupted information on the system’s
equilibria and their stability.
This problem is related with consensus problems where
malicious agents update their states arbitrarily, and a control
must be designed for the honest agents that guarantees con-
sensus; see [5] for first-order and [6] for second-order multi-
agent systems. The control for each agent proposed in [5],
[6] discards information from the neighbors which sensibly
deviates from the current state of the agent. Similarities can
also be established with the problem of stealthy attacks on
cooperative systems investigated in [7]. There, uncertainties
generated by stable dynamical systems are injected into the
cooperative system to disrupt consensus. A hidden network
is then deployed to compete against the attacker.
The role of corrupted measurements in control algorithms
for power networks has been investigated in [8], where the
impact of various measurements attack on voltage controllers
are studied. Corrupting measurements or injecting perturba-
tive terms in the dynamics are only two of the many possible
ways to force a control system to mis-behave. Another possi-
bility in the context of power networks could be to change the
cost coefficients to enable power savings, a scenario that is
related to the problem in [9]. In parallel, a number of studies
have been devoted to the problem of detecting attacks or
malicious behaviors in power networks. Among these many
studies, we mention the geometric approach of [10], [11],
and refer the interested reader to [12] for a comprehensive
introduction to problems of security in network systems with
emphasis on power networks.
Contribution. This paper investigates the effects of biased
marginal cost broadcasts on the performance of distributed
averaging integral controllers for optimal frequency regula-
tion in structure-preserving models of power networks. Using
established tools such as incremental passivity and energy
functions, it is shown how controllers that broadcast biased
information can take advantage of their dishonest action to
decrease their costs by lowering their power production and
inducing the other honest participating units to compensate
for the lack of generated power. In doing so, the overall
demand-supply power balance is not altered — and thus
frequency regulation is ultimately guaranteed — but the
dispatch of power production between units is no longer
optimal. To counteract this dishonesty, we propose a higher-
level honesty-enforcing controller which neutralizes the ac-
tion of dishonest units and restores the previous optimality
condition in which all the agents, including the dishonest
ones, fairly contribute to the optimal power dispatch. The
honesty-enforcing controller can be implemented in a com-
pletely decentralized manner, using only known parameters.
We illustrate our higher-level controller through a simple
simulation. Due to lack of space, the proofs are omitted and
will be presented elsewhere.
II. POWER NETWORK MODEL AND OPTIMAL
DISTRIBUTED FREQUENCY CONTROL
This section provides the power network models and
controllers, and reviews the convergence and optimality for
the resulting closed-loop system without biased information.
A. Dynamical model of the power grid
We consider the Bergen-Hill structure-preserving model of
a quasi-synchronous power network consisting of generators
and frequency-dependent loads [13]. The topology of the grid
is described by an undirected graph G = (V, E) where V is
the set of nodes (buses) and E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges
(transmission lines). We partition the buses of G into two sets
VG and VL, corresponding to the set of generators and loads,
respectively. The power generators can be either inverter-
interfaced or synchronous generator units. The network
operates around a nominal angular frequency ω∗, and to each
bus we associate a phasor voltage Vi∠θi with magnitude
Vi > 0 and phase angle θi ∈ S. At each generator, the
phase θi evolves according to the so-called swing equation




{i,j}∈E | Im(Yij)|ViVj sin(θi − θj) (2)
is the active power injection at bus i. Here, θ˙i is the frequency
deviation from nominal, Mi > 0 is the inertia constant,
Di > 0 is the damping constant, and ui ∈ R is the local
controllable power generation. The value Yij ∈ C is the ad-
mittance of the branch {i, j} ∈ E . Voltage magnitudes Vi are
assumed to be constant, following the standard decoupling
assumption [1], [2], [14], [15]. Relaxing this assumption
requires a more sophisticated analysis [16]. The dynamics
(1) can both model synchronous generators [17] and droop-
controlled inverters with virtual inertia [18], [19] or power
measurement delays [20]. In the case of inverters, Mi is the
virtual inertia or power measurement time constant, and Di is
a tuneable droop control gain. For simplicity, in what follows
we use the term “generator” for either case.
To model loads, we consider frequency-dependent loads
governed by the first-order system [13]
Diθ˙i = P
∗
i − Pi(θ) , i ∈ VL . (3)
Here Di > 0 is the damping coefficient, Pi(θ) is given
by (2), and P ∗i < 0 is the constant power consumption at
the nominal frequency. Technical extensions to the case
of Di = 0 — representing constant power loads — are
also possible. In the desired synchronous steady-state where
θ˙i = 0, θi(t) = θi , i ∈ V, where {θi}i∈V are a set of
constants such that
|θi − θj | < pi
2
, for all {i, j} ∈ E . (4)
In this situation, from (1) and (3) we have that
0 = −P i + ui, i ∈ VG (5a)




{i,j}∈E | Im(Yij)|ViVj sin(θi − θj),
and {u¯i}i∈VG are the steady-state generator injections.
B. Optimal Distributed Frequency Control
We now review how the control inputs ui in (1) are
selected. When ui is constant for all i ∈ VG, under some
technical assumptions the dynamics (1)–(3) converge from
every initial condition to a common steady-state frequency









i∈V Di). When ωss 6= 0, this
represents a static deviation from nominal, which must be
eliminated. To determine the the steady-state values for ui,
















P ∗i . (6b)
where we minimize the total quadratic cost of generation
(6a) subject to the balance of power (6b). Here, qi > 0 is
the cost coefficient and 12qiu
2
i is the local generation cost
at the ith generator. In a synchronous state where θ¨i = 0
for all i ∈ V , the constraint (6b) in fact implies that θ˙i = 0
for all i ∈ V , as one may verify by summing the equations
(1),(3), and hence the frequency is regulated to its nominal
value. Following the standard Lagrange multipliers method,
the optimal control u?i that minimizes (6a) subject to the
constraint (6b) is computed as











is the multiplier of the constraint (6b), and can be interpreted
as the “price” per unit of generation. The equality (7)
implies that uiqi = ujqj for all i, j ∈ VG. That is, the
generators should provide power at identical marginal costs.
The calculation of (8) requires centralized information how-
ever. To distribute the solution of this problem in real-time,
distributed averaging integral controllers have been proposed
in the literature [1]–[4]. These controllers are defined on a




(ξi − ξj)− q−1i ωi (9a)
ui = q
−1
i ξi , (9b)
where ωi = θ˙i and i ∈ VG. Here, the state ξi acts as a
local copy of the multiplier λ for each unit: the term q−1i ωi
attempts to regulate the frequency deviation to zero while
the consensus based algorithm
∑
(ξi − ξj) ensures that the
marginal costs ξi are identical at steady-state.
Next, we write the system in a compact form. To this
end, we need the following nomenclature: For each k =
1, 2, . . . , `, with ` the number of links of the physical
network, let γk be defined as γk = | ImYij |ViVj with {i, j}
being the kth edge of the graph, where the edge numbers
are in accordance with the incidence matrix A of the graph
G. Recall that the incidence matrix A ∈ Rn×` is obtained by
assigning arbitrary orientation to the edges of G, and define
component-wise Avk = 1 if vertex v is the source node of
edge k ∼ (i, j), and Avk = −1 if vertex v is the sink node
of edge k, with all other elements being zero.
We define the diagonal matrix Γ as Γ = diag(γk), with
k = 1, 2, . . . , `. After potentially reordering the nodes, we







generator nodes VG and load nodes VL. It is easy to observe
that the dynamics of the generators and the loads can be
written compactly as
MGθ¨G +DGθ˙G = −AGΓsin(A>θ) + u (10a)
DLθ˙L = −ALΓsin(A>θ) + P ∗L , (10b)
where the indices G and L are used to distinguish gen-
erator with load parameters, respectively. Notice that, if
θ = col(θG, θL) is a solution to (10) for a given input
u, then θ + 1α is also a solution to this system for any
constant α ∈ R. To exclude this rotational invariance in
the analysis, we change to the angular difference variables
η = ATθ. In addition, let ωG = θ˙G, ωL = θ˙L, and
θ˙ = ω = col(ωG, ωL). Then the network dynamics (10),
admits the following representation
η˙ = ATω = ATGωG +A
T
LωL (11a)
MGω˙G +DGωG = −AGΓsin(η) + u (11b)
DLωL = −ALΓsin(η) + P ∗L . (11c)
Note that (η, ω, u) ∈ imAT × R|V| × R|VG|. The controller
(9) can be written in the vector from as
ξ˙ = −Lcξ −Q−1ωG (12a)
u = Q−1ξ , (12b)
where Lc is the Laplacian matrix of the communication
graph Gc, and Q = diag(qi) with i ∈ VG. In vector notation,
the equilibrium/optimality results of the previous subsection
now read for (11)-(12) as
η = ATθ := η (13a)
ω = 0 (13b)











where θ = col(θi), and u? = col(u?i ) given by (7). We also
refer to the above as an optimal synchronous motion of the
power network. Finally, notice from (11) that the vector η
must satisfy






By (4) and the definition of the incidence matrix, the vector η
is in the image of AT, and its elements belong to the interval
(−pi2 , pi2 ). The following assumption guarantees the existence
of a set of equilibrium angles.
Assumption 1: There exists η ∈ (−pi2 , pi2 )` ∩ imAT such
that (15) holds.
The condition in Assumption 1 can be verified using the
results in [1], [21].
III. THE COST OF DISHONESTY
First, we note the following result based on [14], [22]:
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, solutions of the sys-
tem (11)-(12) locally converge to an optimal synchronous
motion (13)-(14).
By the proposition above, the dynamic controller (12)
achieves both frequency regulation and an optimal resource
allocation in steady-state for the power network (11). As
evident from (9), this requires a cooperative scheme where
agents broadcast the state of their controllers in order to reach
a consensus on the marginal costs.
We now depart from this fully cooperative scenario and
consider the case where some agents cheat the system to get
some advantage over other agents. Formulating the way of
cheating as well as the corresponding payoff is by no means
unique. Among all the possibilities, we fix one scenario to be
examined in detail — other variations are listed in Section
VI, the investigation of which we defer to future work.
Note that there are two objectives in the cooperative
scenario. The first objective, which is vital for a properly
functioning network, is to serve the loads by matching the
supply and demand. This is captured by (6b), and leads
to a zero frequency deviation in steady-state. The second
goal amounts to optimizing the dispatch of power injections,
with the optimal dispatch given in (7). This is achieved in
a distributed fashion by reaching a consensus on marginal
costs via the distributed averaging algorithm in (9). The
cheating scenario we consider here is when one or more
agents may broadcast and implement a biased version of the
state of their local controller ξi, rather than the actual one,
in order to lower their local generation cost. It turns out
that this amounts to reporting a fake load by a “dishonest”
agent in an attempt to push the other agents toward more
production. Consequently, the dishonest agent produces less
power (while pretending to produce more) and this will lead
to a drop in its local generation cost. On the other hand, as
we will show, the aforementioned cheating scenario does not
jeopardize frequency regulation.
Let the bias terms be collected in a vector b = col(bi), for
all generators i ∈ VG; if agent i is honest, then bi = 0. The
controller dynamics (12) with bias become
ξ˙ = −Lc(ξ + b)−Q−1ωG (16a)
u = Q−1ξ . (16b)
Note that the agents both broadcast and implement biased
versions of the state of their controllers, yet the controller
output u uses the (possibly lower) unbiased state ξ. Despite
the exchange of biased controller states, we now show that
the frequency is still regulated to its nominal value (under
an appropriate feasibility condition). However, the resulting
synchronous motion will not be the optimal one, as u does
not converge to u?. To state this formally, we need to tailor
Assumption 1 to the controller (16). By fairly straightforward
calculations, it follows that a (non-optimal) synchronous
solution (η, ω, ξ) of (11),(16) with ω = 0 and constant
vectors η and ξ needs to satisfy













which brings us to the following assumption:
Assumption 2: There exists η ∈ (−pi2 , pi2 )` ∩ imAT such
that (17a) holds.
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 2, solutions of the sys-
tem (11),(16) locally converge to (η, ω, ξ) with η satisfying
(17a), ω = 0, and ξ given by (17b).
By the proposition above, the vector u at steady-state is
obtained as
u = Q−1ξ = u? −Πb (18)
where




Therefore, the effect of biased information exchange is to
perturb the optimal steady-state control u? by the term −Πb.
We now investigate the properties of this matrix Π. First,
notice that Π is a symmetric matrix and Π1 = 0. In addition,













Therefore, the matrix Π can be viewed as the Laplacian
matrix of a complete undirected graph with edge weights
−piij given above. We refer to this graph as the cost
graph, denoted by Gpi , versus the physical graph G and the
communication graph Gc. Notice that the edge weights of
Gpi are completely determined by the cost coefficients qi.













|piij |(bi − bj) (21)
by using the structure of the Laplacian matrix Π. The
equality (21) shows how dishonest agents must compete to
decrease their power injections ui and consequently decrease
their local generation costs 12qiu
2
i .
Now let the nodes in VG be partitioned into two subsets
of dishonest agents Vd and honest agents Vh, where we call
an agent i dishonest whenever bi 6= 0, and honest otherwise.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the first d nodes
of VG are dishonest, and b is partitioned as b = col(bd, 0)
with bd ∈ R|Vd| containing no zero entries. The case of only
one dishonest agent, say the first one, is illustrative. In that




which means that agent 1 can lower u1 and thus its gener-
ation cost by applying a positive bias b1 > 0. Notice that
the resulting benefit of this dishonest action depends on the
weighted degree pi11 of agent 1 in the cost graph.
Recall that ui < u?i implies a lower generation cost for
agent i compared with the fair/optimal situation (7). In the
general case of multiple dishonest agents, lower generation
costs can be guaranteed under the following conditions.
Proposition 3: For every i ∈ Vd, the following conditions
are equivalent:





























The term bi − bj in the above indicates the competition
between two dishonest agents i and j to apply a possibly
larger bias, and the third term is the benefit that the dishonest
agent i gets with respect to its honest neighbors.






|piij |bj . (23)
This results in an increase in the local generation cost of
honest agents when dishonest agents apply a positive bias
bj > 0, j ∈ Vd.
In the special case where all dishonest agents apply the






j∈Vh |piij | i ∈ Vd
u?i + b
∗∑
j∈Vd |piij | i ∈ Vh ,
which means a lower generation cost for all dishonest agents,
and a higher one for the honest ones.
IV. COUNTERACTING BIASED INFORMATION VIA A
HIGHER LEVEL CONTROL SCHEME
We have now seen that the presence of biased information
exchange shifts the system away from its optimal steady-state
equilibrium. Our goal now is to design a control scheme
which counteracts the cheating effect of dishonest agents,
and restores the optimal steady-state equilibrium point. To
this end, we add a higher level control layer generating
a “neutralizing” signal, denoted by υi, i ∈ VG. The term
“higher level” reflects the fact the agents are not authorized
to access this control layer. We do not decide a priori whether
an agent is honest or dishonest. With this new control layer
in place, the power network model (11) becomes
η˙ = ATω (24a)
MGω˙G +DGωG = −AGΓsin(η) + u+ υ (24b)
DLωL = −ALΓsin(η) + P ∗L (24c)
with υ = col(υi), i ∈ VG. To dynamically compensate for
possible biased information broadcasted by dishonest agents
in the distributed controller (16), for each i ∈ VG we propose
the following honesty-enforcing controller:
Miχ˙i = −(Di + Fi)ωi − Pi(θ) +Q−1i (ξi + bi) (25a)
υi = λi(χi − ωi) , (25b)
where λi, Fi > 0 are design parameters, and Pi(θ) is the
active power as given by (2).
A few points are in order regarding the controller above.
First, the proposed controller is assumed to have access to
the nodal active power injection Pi = (AGΓsin(η))i, the
frequency ωi, the parameters Mi and Qi, and the biased
transmitted information ξi + bi, i ∈ VG. Notice that the
controller does not exploit the actual unbiased information
ξi. Moreover, observe that the parameter Di needs not to be
exactly known and an upper bound is sufficient thanks to the
design parameter Fi. Finally, note that the controller above
is fully decentralized.
The dynamics (25) can be written compactly as
Mχ˙ = −(DG + F )ωG − PG +Q−1(ξ + b) (26a)
υ = Λ(χ− ωG) (26b)














Fig. 1. The solid lines denote the transmission lines in G, and the dashed
lines depict the communication links in Gc.
An optimal synchronous motion of (24) with the dis-
tributed averaging controller (16) and the decentralized con-
troller (26) is any solution with a zero frequency deviation,
η satisfying Assumption 1, and the optimality condition
defined by
u+ υ = u?, (27)
with u? given by (14). By straightforward calculations, such
a solution satisfies
ω = 0 (28a)




χ = Λ−1Q−1b (28c)
and (15). The main result of this section is provided in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: (Dynamic compensation for biased informa-
tion) Consider the power network model (24) with the
distributed averaging controller (16) and the decentralized
honesty-enforcing controller (26). Then, under Assumption
1, solutions of the closed-loop system locally converge to
an optimal synchronous motion defined by (27), (28), and
η = η satisfying (15).
By Theorem 1, the higher level controller (26) asymp-
totically compensates for the mismatch u − u? to achieve
the optimality condition (27). By (24b), the latter yields
PG = AGΓsin(η) = u
? which coincides with the original
optimality condition (14).
V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We illustrate the proposed results by a numerical example
of a power network consisting of three power sources and
two loads. The interconnection topology is depicted in Figure
1. The network parameters are chosen as: MG1 = 4.49,
MG2 = 4.22, MG3 = 0.50, DG1 = 1.38, DG2 = 1.42,
DG3 = 0.50, DL1 = 1.00, DL2 = 1.00. The (negative of
the) line susceptances are chosen as shown in Figure 1.
The system is initially at steady-state with a constant
loading. At time t = 5, loads L1 and L2 are increased by 10
percent of their original values. The frequency evolution and
the active power injections are depicted in Figure 2(a) and
2(b). It is observed that the system is regulating the frequency
at 50 Hz (the frequencies at the various nodes are so similar
to each other that no difference can be noticed in the plot).
The active power is shared according to the ratios q−1G1 = 3,
q−1G2 = 2, and q
−1
G3
= 1. Now, at time t = 45, agents 1 and 2
attempt to cheat the system by applying a bias b1 = 5 and










































Fig. 2. Frequency behavior and optimal resource allocation: (a) frequency
regulation (b) active power sharing in the presence of both biased informa-
tion and the higher level control (c) active power sharing in the presence of
biased information but in the absence of the higher level control.
b2 = 15. The third agent does not apply a bias and b3 = 0.
Note that the higher level controller (26) is in place. As can
be seen from Figure 2(a), frequency is still regulated to its
nominal value. Moreover, the controller (26) foils the attempt
of dishonest agents to manipulate the active power sharing.
Finally, we have shown the status of active power sharing
in the absence of the higher level controller in Figure 2(c).
Clearly, active power sharing is affected by the cheating in
this case, and consequently agent 2 (who applied the largest
bias) produces much less power than expected, while agents
1 and 3 have to compensate for that.
VI. OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION
The paper focuses on how dishonest agents participating
in optimal distributed frequency control can transmit biased
estimates of their marginal costs, achieving economic gain
at the direct expense of honest agents. Many other scenarios
could be considered, for instance, agents could directly bias
their control actions ui, or use both biased information and
control for more sophisticated dishonest actions. Even more,
one could imagine the scenario in which the dishonest agent
sends different biased information to its different neighbors,
a scenario which could be related to the case of Byzantine
faults. In addition, instead of using an undirected communi-
cation graph, one could bias the calculation by intentionally
using higher or lower weights on the incoming data from
neighbors. The nature of the corrupting signal could also
be substantially enriched. In this paper, we have used a
constant bias term, but such term could also be generated
by an intelligent adversary that uses a dynamical system
possibly in feedback with the physical network to alter the
overall behavior [23], [7]. The investigation of these control
scenarios is a widely open research arena.
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